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Power, Morality, and Self-Interest: 
The United States and European Union 
Foreign Policy Impact on 
Human Rights in Colombia
Federico Segura Molina
Preface
This essay examines the impact of the foreign policy of the United 
States and the European Union (EU) on the human rights situation 
in Colombia. Not only was this project an essential component of the 
Macalester-Maastricht Globalization in Comparative Perspective Study 
Abroad Program, but a variety of factors also motivated my study:
•  Colombia is an anomaly in the study of foreign policy and human 
rights. As a region with uncommon political, economic, and social 
realities, Colombia is a country where two distinct approaches to 
foreign policy and human rights, those of the U.S. and EU, are simul-
taneously at work. Despite their significant ideological and philo-
sophical differences, however, both the U.S. and the EU strongly 
support Colombia’s administration and its national policies. In 
order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the human rights 
situation in Colombia and to create effective policies in the future, it 
is important to understand the unusual impact international action 
has had on national policy and the fate of human rights.
•  It is imperative to reconcile these two different approaches to for-
eign policy, as well as the myriad perspectives and accounts of 
the current human rights situation in Colombia. It is my desire to 
inspire reflection upon how past and current actions of the U.S. and 
the EU have ameliorated or deteriorated the human rights situation 
in Colombia. In addition, I hope to contribute to the search for a 
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long-lasting solution to the political, economic, social, and ideologi-
cal chaos that has wreaked havoc upon Colombian society.
•  Finally, I have a strong personal connection to the topic. As a citizen 
of Colombia who is pursuing an undergraduate degree in Interna-
tional Studies in the United States and the Netherlands, I have a 
deep interest in exploring the complex connections between Colom-
bia, the United States, and the European Union.
The development of this project has been set against a rapidly chang-
ing backdrop. Major events between 2007 and 2008 include a deep 
institutional crisis based on a confrontation between Colombia’s execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial powers; the infiltration of paramilitary and 
guerrilla elements into the state apparatus and all spheres of public 
life (known as “parapolitica” and “farcpolitica,” respectively); critical 
changes within guerrilla and paramilitary organizational structures; 
the prospect of a third period in office of President Uribe, along with 
an impending change in U.S. administration and significant changes 
to EU foreign policy brought about by the implementation of the 2007 
Lisbon Treaty; and the unexpected liberation of 2002 Colombian presi-
dential candidate and French citizen Ingrid Betancourt, along with the 
subsequent reactions in France and around the globe. While it proved 
challenging to comprehend the impact of these events on the human 
rights situation in Colombia, the changing nature of the subject cer-
tainly made my research all the more fascinating.
Apart from the way events unfolded throughout 2007 and 2008, my 
experiences during the fall and spring semesters also revealed different 
viewpoints regarding the subject matter. An internship as a fundrais-
ing and outreach assistant at the Nonviolent Peaceforce during my fall 
semester provided me with a new perspective on U.S. involvement in 
Colombian politics. As a grassroots, unarmed civilian initiative seek-
ing to address the human rights situation in Colombia, the Nonviolent 
Peaceforce is critical of the Bush Administration’s current military-
based approach. This experience has allowed me to analyze U.S. poli-
cies from a variety of angles, thus helping provide the most unbiased 
account possible.
During my spring semester, I participated in the Macalester-Maas-
tricht Globalization in Comparative Perspective program in Maas-
tricht, the Netherlands. Exposed to Europe’s different understanding 
of human rights, I was able to compare Europe’s approaches to foreign 
policy with those of the U.S. Moreover, taking classes led by Euro-
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pean professors; conducting interviews with professors, students, and 
policy makers; and attending lectures and conferences shed light on 
European perspectives regarding general American foreign policies as 
well as those directed specifically at Colombia.
I. Introduction
The foreign policy of the United States and the European Union 
toward Colombia is of some importance to all three parties involved. 
For decades the U.S. has played a key role in influencing the global 
political economy and the fields of international security and develop-
ment. The EU is a rising international actor seeking to advance its own 
model of global governance, of which the rule of law, peace, democ-
racy, and the promotion of human rights are all critical components. As 
a developing country with a long-standing internal armed conflict inti-
mately tied to the production and commercialization of illegal drugs 
and extensive human rights violations, Colombia has been a historical 
focus for U.S. and EU foreign policy efforts as part of the global war 
on terrorism and narcotics. Beyond such efforts, there are important 
underlying political, economic, security, and ideological interests in 
the foreign policies of the two entities toward Colombia.
In response to a significant gap in the foreign policy assessment 
literature (particularly regarding EU foreign policy), it is important to 
determine how successful the U.S. and EU foreign policies in Colom-
bia have been in achieving their particular goals and expectations. 
Even more important to this study is the degree to which Colombia 
has benefited from its interaction with the U.S. and the EU. In addition, 
it is imperative to examine the extent to which the specific Colombian 
populations targeted by the U.S. and EU have been able to fulfill their 
rights and meet their own interests and needs through these foreign 
policies. This leads to the following research question: How successful 
have the U.S. and EU been in meeting (a) their own national interests 
and policy objectives, and (b) the human rights needs of the Colom-
bian population?
In light of the research question, this study argues that, through a 
focus on military and development aid, U.S. foreign policy has par-
tially achieved the restoration of public order in Colombia and the 
protection of Colombian citizens’ individual rights to personal security 
and freedom of movement. In addition, through a free-trade regime, 
U.S. foreign policy has promoted important welfare rights in Colom-
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bia, including the right to work and to protection against hunger and 
poverty. Yet in doing so, the U.S. has also undermined basic civil, 
political, and socioeconomic rights of large segments of the Colom-
bian population, particularly those whose ideological inclinations and 
economic means of livelihood oppose U.S. interests. For its part, EU 
foreign policy has had limited but promising success in the promotion 
of basic civil, political, and socioeconomic human rights in Colombia 
by tackling their root causes and the structural aspects of poverty and 
inequality.
In Section II, I set the context of my analysis by underscoring the 
main aspects of foreign policy analysis. In Section III, I engage in a 
discussion of U.S. and EU models of global power and governance 
and then I go on to provide an overview of U.S. and EU foreign pol-
icy. In Section IV, I provide a theoretical and practical analysis of the 
relationship between foreign policy and international human rights in 
general, and specifically in the context of U.S. and EU foreign policy. 
In Section V, I map out the historical background and current human 
rights situation in Colombia. Sections VI and VII provide the historical 
background and highlight the main events and themes of U.S. and EU 
involvement in Colombia. In Section VIII, I discuss the impact of U.S. 
and EU involvement in Colombia’s human rights situation, and pro-
vide some analytical reflections on the combined human rights impact 
of both policies. In Section IX, I provide four recommendations for a 
more successful U.S. and EU foreign policy that maximizes its positive 
impact on Colombia’s human rights situation. Finally, I conclude with 
a summary of the main arguments, suggest areas for further research, 
and discuss some reflections and lessons of my study on the phenom-
enon of globalization.
The moral assumptions that “human rights are the rights one has 
simply because one is a human being”1 and that human rights are 
universally accepted as normative ideal standards permeate the study. 
This is done intentionally in order to avoid claims of cultural and 
historical relativism, as well as debates over the philosophical founda-
tions and origins of international human rights standards. While such 
claims and debates constitute an important element of human rights 
theory, they fall outside the scope of this study.
The framework I employ to conceptualize human rights and deter-
mine the human rights impact of U.S. and EU foreign policy toward 
Colombia is inspired by Jack Donnelly’s “Universal Declaration 
Model,” a synthesis of rights that are encapsulated in the 1948 Univer-
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sal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Human 
Rights Covenants on civil/ political rights and socioeconomic and cul-
tural rights. These three documents are the basis for the consensus 
on internationally recognized human rights. My framework further 
synthesizes Donnelly’s model by focusing on and categorizing those 
rights that are paramount to the human rights situation in Colombia.2 
The framework is broken down into the following three categories of 
rights:
•  Basic human rights, including the rights to life, liberty, security of 
person, nondiscrimination, and protection against torture.
•  Civil/Political or freedom human rights, including the rights to 
equal protection under the law; protection against arbitrary arrest, 
detention, or exile; humane treatment when deprived of liberty; 
privacy; freedom of movement; freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion; freedom of opinion and expression; and freedom of assem-
bly and association.
•  Social/Economic or welfare human rights, including the rights to 
social security, work, adequate standard of living, education, free-
dom from hunger, and health.
The bulk of the findings presented in this essay are based upon an 
extensive analysis of both primary and secondary sources. I examine 
diverse sources from both sides of the political spectrum—documents 
written by guerrilla leaders in Colombia to speeches by President 
Bush, reports prepared by the U.S. Embassy to those of Human Rights 
groups. While an examination of books, journal articles, opinion pieces, 
and government documents constituted the major part of my research, 
interviews conducted in Europe also played an important role in the 
process by providing me with new insights about European foreign 
policy. In addition, numerous conferences and lectures furthered these 
research endeavors by providing other perspectives with which to 
examine my primary research questions.
II. Understanding General Foreign Policy
Often viewed as an ambiguous and unclear concept, foreign policy 
is one of the most crucial instruments in international relations. An 
examination of the meaning of foreign policy allows us to comprehend 
its importance in global affairs. It can be defined as “actions taken by 
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governments which are directed at the environment external to their 
state with the objective of changing or sustaining that environment 
in some way.”3 However, in light of the complexities of the field of 
foreign policy analysis and the vast number of possible combinations 
of actors and parties (including individual governments and inter-
governmental arrangements like the European Union, supranational 
organizations like the United Nations, and civil society and other non-
state actors) as well as a multiplicity of activities (including unilateral, 
bilateral, and multilateral actions), it is essential to find a focus.
The focus of this study is on bilateral governmental and intergov-
ernmental foreign policy. This is because national governments tend 
to have more foreign policy resources at their disposal than multilat-
eral organizations, and the impact of their foreign policy actions can 
be more easily isolated than that of multilateral arrangements. The 
essay acknowledges, however, that such policy can be channeled indi-
rectly through multilateral systems, international financial institutions, 
transnational corporations, and civil society organizations.
While the purpose of foreign policy can vary depending on the 
actors involved and the conditions in which the policy is conceived 
and executed, “considerations of power, national security, ideology 
and economic interests remain the main objectives of foreign policy.”4 
Specific policy objectives and the mechanisms employed vary greatly 
depending upon how national and foreign policy interests are pri-
oritized. Diplomacy, aid, and trade and investment are among the 
most commonly employed mechanisms and strategies in the world 
of foreign policy. Through the coordination of such instruments, for-
eign policy can display hard power (e.g., military intervention) or soft 
power (e.g., moral and normative pressure); coercive action (e.g., sanc-
tions and other punitive measures); or constructive engagement (e.g., 
bilateral cooperation).
III. U.S. and EU Models of International Order 
and their Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice
McCormick provides a recurring and appropriate characterization of 
the U.S. and the EU in the international relations literature through 
the concepts of Europeanism and Americanism.5 Europeanism is char-
acterized by peace, multilateralism and community, internationalism, 
soft/civilian power, and a liberal worldview. It encapsulates a pro-
gressive, modest, and pragmatic approach to international policy. In 
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contrast, McCormick describes Americanism as a model based upon 
war, unilateralism and individualism, nationalism, and hard/military 
power. When developing global policy, Americanism is extremely 
ambitious and displays a realist, orthodox worldview.
A. U.S. Foreign Policy Overview
The United States’ primary goals and means of accomplishing its for-
eign policy objectives can be summarized as peace and security through 
neo-liberal economics, trade, and development. Providing military aid 
to countries in need is also a key component of U.S. policy, as it is 
believed that it facilitates cooperation in the global community.6 U.S. 
foreign policy, however, is by no means fixed. It is contingent upon an 
administration’s understanding of national interests and objectives, a 
fact that often creates problems affecting the entire international sys-
tem.
The problem of continuity and consistency is exemplified by the 
foreign policy of the Clinton and the George W. Bush Administrations. 
The former placed greater emphasis on international cooperation and 
conflict resolution in, for example, Northern Ireland and the Middle 
East. In addition, the Clinton Administration possessed a strong con-
viction that the U.S. should not only play a role in the protection of 
human rights abroad, but that the U.S. also benefits from facilitating 
the advancement of human rights because of a newfound political and 
economic international stability.
In contrast, the Bush Administration demonstrates a greater concern 
with strong political and economic relations with its neighbors and 
defending national interests through interventionist practices such as 
those in Afghanistan and Iraq. This involvement is often at the expense 
of international cooperation in the fields of the environment, global 
economy, and international security and justice, to name a few. Yet, 
the humanitarian aid and poverty reduction programs in Africa, par-
ticularly the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, have had a 
positive impact and are often regarded as the greatest foreign policy 
achievement of the Bush Administration.
While all administrations, regardless of political affiliation, can be 
hailed or criticized in some manner, drastic changes in foreign policy 
approaches can have significant political, economic, security, and social 
consequences for the recipient state. The international community has 
had to adapt to radical changes in the U.S. approach to foreign policy. 
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Specifically, the world has had to adjust to the Bush Administration’s 
foreign policy, characterized by the tendency to act unilaterally though 
hard, military power. This change has been criticized by Diplomats 
and Military Commanders for Change (DMCC), a group of former U.S. 
statesmen. The DMCC states that:
From the outset, President George W. Bush adopted an overbearing 
approach to America’s role in the world, relying upon military might 
and righteousness, insensitive to the concerns of traditional friends and 
allies, and disdainful of the United Nations. Instead of building upon 
America’s great economic and moral strength to lead other nations in 
a coordinated campaign to address the causes of terrorism and to stifle 
its resources, the Administration, motivated more by ideology than by 
reasoned analysis, struck out on its own…The Bush Administration has 
shown that it does not grasp these circumstances of the new era, and is 
not able to rise to the responsibilities of world leadership in either style 
or substance. It is time for a change.7
B. EU Foreign Policy Overview
Historically, EU foreign policy largely has been an intergovernmen-
tal matter, with member states controlling their own relations to a 
large extent. Instead of each member state acting on its own, foreign 
policy is utilized as a progressive measure by the Union to speak with 
a single and coherent voice.8 The singular policy that envelopes the 
objectives of the entire EU is known as the Common Foreign Security 
Policy (CFSP).
Like the U.S., the EU strives to promote international security, 
defense, and peace and stability. Human rights, democracy and good 
governance, and the rule of law are also stressed in EU relationships. 
The EU attempts to fulfill its objectives through development and 
humanitarian aid, trade, and international cooperation.9
The Amsterdam Treaty spells out five fundamental objectives of 
the CFSP: (1) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, 
independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter; (2) to strengthen the security of 
the Union in all ways; (3) to preserve peace and strengthen interna-
tional security; (4) to promote international co-operation; and (5) to 
develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law while respect-
ing human rights and fundamental freedoms.10
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In addition to these objectives, the EU favors international coopera-
tion and pooling the national sovereignty of individual member states 
for mutual benefit (internally, through integration and expansion of 
the Union, and externally, through its foreign policy). The EU also 
supports the work of the United Nations and International Criminal 
Court, as well as international protocols and human rights agreements. 
While the EU has been praised for its humanitarian focus, its poli-
cies are not without criticism. As stated by various critics of the EU, 
“the Union has made less progress in forging a common foreign and 
security policy over the years than in creating a single market and a 
single currency.”11 Continuing the argument that the EU is primarily 
concerned with creating a powerful currency, Hill and Smith claim that 
the development of the EU was a “purely empirical event” practically 
ignored by international relations theorists. The importance of Euro-
pean integration, they suggest, is minimal when compared to that of 
the political economy.12
In addition to such criticisms, the basic concept of one major union 
with various member states creates tensions between the multilateral-
ism conducted by individual EU member states as well as the bilater-
alism between the EU and the target of foreign policy. Attempts have 
been made over the years to streamline the way CFSP decisions are 
taken; however, key decisions still require a unanimous vote.
A unanimous vote was difficult to attain when there were only fif-
teen EU members; now that there are 25 members, it is increasingly 
complicated to reach a decision. Despite their commitment to the CFSP, 
member governments often struggle with changing their own national 
policy in the name of EU solidarity. Just how difficult this can be was 
illustrated by the deep divisions among EU member states in spring 
2003 over whether the U.N. Security Council should authorize the 
U.S.-led war against Iraq.13 At a summit meeting in December 2003, 
EU leaders adopted a European security strategy. It recognizes that 
citizens in Europe and elsewhere face potential threats from terrorism, 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and illegal immigration. 
Each kind of threat needs an appropriate response, often requiring 
international cooperation.14 Despite historical, ideological, and cultural 
similarities, there are clear differences in the way the United States and 
the European Union are perceived and represented in the international 
relations literature. Yet, there is also a long history of military and eco-
nomic cooperation between the U.S. and Europe through the North 
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and through the single most 
important commercial relationship in the world.
IV. The Role of Human Rights in EU and U.S. Foreign Policy
Donnelly argues that, “although universal rights [are] held equally 
by all human beings everywhere, states have near exclusive respon-
sibility to implement them for their own nationals.”15 At the same 
time, the state can act as the principal violator or essential protector of 
human rights. While this may have been the case up until now, I would 
argue that in our age of globalization and interconnectivity, the statist 
conception—that the state is only capable of and responsible for real-
izing the rights of its own citizens—has been expanded in practice to 
include an ability and thus a responsibility to ensure the rights of for-
eign nationals abroad. This demands that we embrace an internation-
ally recognized role for states in the implementation of human rights 
worldwide, whereby they can play a dual role of realizing or violating 
human rights abroad through the direct impact of their foreign policies 
or the indirect consequences of their policies on another state.
Claims that a foreign policy aimed at changing the human rights 
environment in Colombia (whether or not that is the main interest of 
such policy) violates Colombia’s state sovereignty and its ability to deal 
with its internal human rights affairs, and counterclaims that such a 
policy is a clear example of moral imperialism, are simply not applica-
ble to the Colombian case. Given the deep involvement of U.S. and EU 
foreign policy in Colombia’s national policy and internal human rights 
affairs, as well as the fact that all three parties subscribe to internation-
ally recognized human rights standards described in the 1948 Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Human 
Rights Covenants, one cannot argue that such a change would violate 
Colombia’s sovereignty. Whether or not the U.S. and the EU respect or 
violate these principles through their foreign policy in Colombia is a 
separate issue.
Power, national security, ideology, and economic interests remain 
the paramount objectives of foreign policy, with the human rights of 
foreign nationals mattering in varying degrees and “few countries 
making more than occasional, modest sacrifices of other foreign policy 
interests in the name of human rights.”16 This does not mean, however, 
that the human rights of foreign nationals may not be a legitimate 
or even altruistic foreign policy interest (especially in the absence of 
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other national interests), nor that they always are at odds with other 
foreign policy interests. Furthermore, states may undertake foreign 
policy human rights initiatives because they are legally, politically, or 
morally demanded by the general public of a state irrespective of other 
national interests.17
The realist perspective on human rights and foreign policy charac-
terizing the current U.S. administration suggests, however, that U.S. 
foreign policy in Colombia is nothing but a means to fulfill obliga-
tions to and secure the human rights of U.S. nationals. This does not 
imply an explicit concern for the human rights of Colombian nationals 
despite what the foreign policy of the U.S. might say “on paper.” In 
fact, it may well mean a lack of concern for the human rights of Colom-
bian nationals on the part of the United States. A unilateral foreign 
policy aimed only at protecting American interests may prioritize, for 
example, anti-drug efforts over human rights in Colombia.18 Yet, and 
still in line with the realist perspective, U.S. (and EU) foreign policy 
interests could also be instrumentally achieved through the protection 
of Colombian nationals’ human rights.
In contrast, the liberal view that characterizes the EU suggests 
achieving EU foreign policy goals through bilateral cooperation and 
constructive engagement in a way that would mutually enable Europe 
and Colombia to fulfill their obligations to and realize the rights of 
European and Colombian nationals, respectively.
This raises two important questions directly linked to the original 
research question. First, do the U.S. and the EU treat human rights 
abroad as legal demands or simply as moral aspirations? Second, 
how and through what means does violating or realizing the rights 
of Colombian nationals help the U.S. and the EU fulfill their respec-
tive foreign policy interests, including the human rights of their own 
nationals? What appears to be clear, and will be discussed later in this 
analysis, is that foreign policy can have major consequences on human 
rights abroad, whether or not human rights are a foreign policy prior-
ity.
Human rights, argues Donnelly, are an important element of Ameri-
can national identity and values. This is because “the particular com-
bination of moral, historical, political, and national interest concerns 
have led to a strong human rights policy,”19 which contrasts with 
the perception of the U.S. as a realist actor. However, Buckley notes 
America’s “cyclical romances with the notion of responsibility for the 
rights of extranationals.”20 This responsibility has been understood, on 
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one hand, as America’s human rights mission to set an example and 
through its active international involvement on behalf of international 
human rights. On the other hand, there can be apparent disregard of 
the responsibility for human rights beyond it borders.
V. The Human Rights Situation in Colombia
Since the arrival of the conquistadores in the late 15th and 16th centu-
ries, Colombia has had the distinct dishonor of suffering some of the 
worst human rights abuses on record. Colombia continues to have one 
of the highest murder rates in the world, an astonishing number of dis-
placed people, and a long history of crimes against union members.21 
In addition, poverty is rampant, creating intense class conflict and low 
standards of living.22 When examined using the human rights frame-
work for this study, Colombia’s human rights situation is especially 
complex, bearing witness to violations of all three rights categories: 
basic human rights, civil/political human rights, and social/economic 
human rights.
Although various analysts claim that the exact number of people 
who have died as the result of government, paramilitary, and guer-
rilla activity will never be known, it is estimated that more than 35,000 
Colombians have been killed within the past decade. Massacres in 
areas with little to no state presence and high levels of illegal activi-
ties, specifically narco-trafficking, were also common occurrences in 
Colombia’s recent past. As reported by Gustavo Gallón, Director of 
Colombian Commission of Jurists, there were 160 separate massacres 
from October 1999 to October 2000 in which 1,084 people were killed.23 
While basic human rights violations have either directly or indirectly 
affected almost all sectors of Colombian society, union workers repre-
sent an area of the population that has suffered severe civil and politi-
cal rights infractions.
According to a report published by the late Senator Paul Wellstone, 
paramilitary groups (with the occasional participation of guerrilla 
groups) led an undeclared war against Colombian union leaders for 
over fifteen years. Like the U.S., Colombia guarantees its workers the 
right to organize; in Colombia, however, organizing frequently costs a 
union member his life.24 In the year 2000, 129 trade union leaders were 
assassinated; in the year 2001, 159 others were murdered. While union 
leaders were specifically targeted for years, any member of society 
who took an active stance against human rights violations was risking 
Federico Segura Molina
181
his life. This is demonstrated in the fact that between 1986 and 2001, 
418 educators were murdered, struck down for fighting for students’ 
rights to quality education or for publicly criticizing a political group 
or figure.25
Internal displacement of the Colombian people is also a major item 
of discussion on the human rights agenda. As of 2007, there were 
between 1.8 to 3 million displaced Colombians, second only after 
Sudan.26 In 2001, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton reported that approxi-
mately 300,000 people are displaced each year, the majority of whom 
are poor, indigenous, or Afro-Colombian.27 Driven from their homes 
and jobs in fear for their lives, these displaced Colombians are not only 
deprived of their civil and political human rights, but also stripped of 
their economic and social ones.
With an unemployment rate of 11.2% and with 49.2% of the popula-
tion living below the poverty line,28 the right to an adequate standard 
of living is enjoyed by only half of the total population. Various schol-
ars argue that the privatization of public services, along with the influx 
of agricultural imports, has worsened Colombia’s human rights situa-
tion.29
Due to Colombia’s vastly complex human rights situation, it is ever 
more critical to analyze the role that U.S. and EU policies play in the 
country’s human rights agenda. Unfortunately, despite the EU’s and 
the U.S.’s best intentions, some scholars claim that Colombia will be 
incapable of implementing any proactive human rights strategy with 
its current distribution of economic, military, and political power.30 
Colombia’s human rights situation is further complicated by the fact 
that victims of violations may also be perpetrators. For example, a 
guerrilla group whose right to freedom of thought and expression may 
be denied by the Colombian state may also conduct massacres and 
kill union leaders. Furthermore, one cannot forget that perpetrators 
are also human beings, and, as such, they are entitled to their human 
rights. Issues such as balancing the rights of the majority population 
with those of national minorities raise the questions of which and 
whose rights should the U.S. and EU prioritize.
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VI. U.S. Involvement in Colombia
A. Background
America’s extensive involvement in Colombia dates back to the Mon-
roe Doctrine of 1823. By declaring Latin America within its sphere of 
influence and forbidding Britain and Spain, the former imperial pow-
ers, from exercising control over the region, the U.S. set a precedent 
for its future engagements in the region. By 1903, the U.S. was already 
exercising its power when it sought to gain control of the Panama 
Canal. The U.S. finally gained control of the region by helping Panama 
engineer its secession from Colombia.
In 1946, the U.S. established the School of the Americas (SOA), now 
known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 
(WHISC) in 1946 in Panama to “bring stability to Latin America.” Vari-
ous scholars claim that Latin American police and government offi-
cials learned the arts of torture, assassination, intimidation, and death 
squad deployment from U.S. officials. Evidence for this claim is the 
extensive list of Colombian officers who not only were tried for human 
rights abuses, but were also graduates of the School of the Americas, 
thus providing a link between the U.S. and human rights abuses.31 
Currently, SOA alumni top the lists as perpetrators of major atrocities 
throughout Colombia and Latin America.32
Scholars support the theory that the U.S. backed the assassination of 
liberal presidential candidate Jorge Elieser Gaitán in 1948, leading to 
three days of brutal violence and the destruction of downtown Bogotá, 
known as El Bogotazo. Ensuing civil war, known as “La Violencia,” 
lasted until 1958.
Following the 1952 Military Assistance Agreement between Colom-
bia and the U.S. as well as several loans to President Rojas Pinilla’s 
right-wing government by the U.S. to fight insurgence, the Pentagon 
designed the 1964 Operation Marquetalia. The Colombian govern-
ment attacked peasant self-defense communities formed in response 
to income inequality and social injustice. This marks the official birth 
of the Marxist guerrilla group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC-EP). In 1984, U.S.-backed Operation Condor aimed 
to eliminate progressive, liberal, and revolutionary elements of Colom-
bian society.
During the 1990s and 2000s, U.S. assistance to Colombia focused 
on increasing military and police aid in response to the deteriorating 
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security situation within Colombia. U.S. military and police aid to 
Colombia went from $88.5 million in 1997 to 308 million in 1999, with 
additional installments in ensuing years.33
B. Plan Colombia
Originally marketed as part of the “war on drugs” and later as part of 
the “war on terror,” Plan Colombia was adopted in September 1999 by 
President Pastrana “for peace, prosperity and strengthening of state.” 
Still functioning today, the purpose of the plan is to end a forty-year 
guerrilla movement, eradicate drug production and trafficking, and 
restore public order through the strengthening of the Colombian state.34 
President Pastrana identified five pillars to Plan Colombia: a peace pro-
cess, the economy, counter-drug strategy, reform of the judicial system, 
and social development.35 As the largest, most comprehensive display 
of direct U.S. intervention in the hemisphere, Plan Colombia is a secu-
rity-based approach to foreign policy that addresses issues of national 
security, terrorism, and narco-trafficking, through military means and 
direct military intervention, as well as through alternative economic 
development.36 Colombia is the third largest recipient of U.S. military 
aid (after Israel and Egypt). U.S. military aid totaled $1.3 billion in 
2000, $153.4 million in 2001, and $186.4 million in 2002. It is estimated 
that roughly 80% of the aid went to military and police programs while 
only 20% went to social programs.37 In 2008, aid increased to $542 mil-
lion, while $545 million has been requested for 2009 ($402.823 million 
or 73% toward military programs and anti-terrorist assistance, while 
$142.366 million or 27% toward social development programs).38 While 
the U.S. and Colombia requested aid from Europe for the program, EU 
countries have not yet contributed significantly to this effort.
C. Economic Policy and Trade
The U.S. remains Colombia’s most important commercial partner. 
The “Tratado de Libre Comercio” (TLC) is the Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) between Colombia and the U.S. that was signed in 2006 but has 
not yet been ratified by the U.S. congress. According to the Bush and 
Uribe Administrations, the TLC will play a crucial role in promoting 
important social-economic rights in Colombia through increased trade 
and less regulation between the two countries. However, the treaty’s 
approval was initially delayed until April 2008 and remains unap-
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proved to this date due to Colombia’s still worrying human rights 
record, specifically with regards to the rights of union workers and 
the current state of Colombia’s healthcare system. Washington is also 
weary of, and demands further clarification regarding, the alleged 
links between President Uribe and ultra-right paramilitary elements 
before the treaty can be revisited.
It has been argued that economic intervention and control of major 
utilities and industries are a significant element of U.S. economic 
policy toward Colombia,39 and that Colombia’s indebtedness to U.S. 
banks, the IMF, and the World Bank continues to grant the United 
States virtually unrestricted access to Colombia’s natural resources and 
biodiversity.40 This is in line with the view that the U.S. is committed to 
fighting insurgencies in order to gain and maintain control over Latin 
America’s natural resources, particularly petroleum and cheap labor.41
VII. EU Involvement in Colombia
A. Background
Although the EU is currently making considerable efforts to involve 
itself in improving Colombia’s economic, political and social situation, 
the EU’s participation in Colombian (and Latin American) affairs has 
been minimal when compared to that of the U.S. Starting in the late 
1980s, however, the EU became increasingly proactive. Employing a 
multi-layered strategy to facilitate peace, the EU uses diplomacy, trade, 
and aid to fulfill its policy goals. The EU provides political and finan-
cial support to existing peace initiatives.42
In addition to providing aid, the EU increasingly involves itself in 
negotiations for peace. It constantly encourages the Colombian govern-
ment to create a dialogue with the country’s armed resistance. Believ-
ing that peace talks will improve Colombia’s security situation, the EU 
has claimed that it is ready to provide complete financial support for 
this initiative, assuming that the result of such talks are strategies con-
cerning “concentration, disarmament, demobilization and reintegra-
tion of the members of the illegal armed groups in the society.”43
B. EU Aid to Colombia: Military vs. Humanitarian
Providing aid is one of the three main components of EU foreign pol-
icy regarding Colombia. In contrast to the U.S., however, the EU is 
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extremely hesitant to provide military aid, preferring to grant sup-
port for humanitarian and social programs. From 2002–2006, the EU 
provided €105 million for funding alternative development (28.5%); 
economic and social development and reducing poverty (38%); admin-
istrative and legal reforms (24%); and promoting human rights (9.5%). 
From 2007 to 2011, the EU plans to allocate €104 million to fund (with 
an additional €56 million in 2011–13) peace and stability, including 
alternative development (70%); rule of law, justice and human rights 
(20%); and productivity, competition and trade (10%).44
In addition to the aid programs, the EU provides Colombia with 
considerable grant support. Member states of the European Commu-
nity have strived to coordinate efforts to establish a strong framework 
for the pursuit of peace in Colombia, and have provided aid since 1994, 
which has totaled over €100 million in fourteen years.45 In 2004 alone, 
the EU contributed over $420 million in support of the peace process, 
human rights, and the environment.
In 2005, the EU unveiled a multi-million euro plan to help Colom-
bia’s displaced people. Targeting approximately 130,000 people a year, 
the plan hopes to provide aid immediately after people have been 
displaced. Food and essential non-food items, water and sanitation, 
shelter, health care, and protection are at the core of the plan. Not only 
does this plan attempt to restore the rights that displaced people lose 
when driven from their homes, but it also offers assistance to families 
of missing persons.46
C. The EU and Plan Colombia
In contrast to the U.S., which assigns an overwhelming majority of its 
aid to military programs, the EU has declared its active anti-military 
stance on various occasions. Stating that Colombia will not achieve sta-
bility unless it engages in an actual peace process and that military aid 
will not lead to lasting peace, the EU clearly distinguishes its policies 
from those of the U.S. This distinction displays itself when one exam-
ines the EU’s participation in Plan Colombia.47
When the Colombian government and then-President Clinton 
announced Plan Colombia in 2000, they asked the EU and other inter-
national donors to contribute to the social aspect of the plan. The EU, 
not wanting to involve itself in the military aspect, again channeled 
its support toward the peace process. Providing approximately €330 
million, the EU directed its aid to Plan Colombia’s initiatives target-
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ing poverty, economic inequality, and civil rights. When assigning its 
aid, the EU warned against the possible negative consequences of crop 
fumigation, and insisted on the necessity of providing farmers with 
adequate production alternatives.48 Moreover, the European Union 
created the “Laboratorios de Paz” (Peace Labs) in order to address the 
root causes and structural aspects of inequality, poverty, and wealth 
distribution. This is the EU’s biggest project in Colombia, with a total 
budget of €42.2 million over eight years (the EU contributes €34.8 mil-
lion and the Colombian government the rest). It covers an area as big 
as Belgium, with a population of 800,000. The plan was proposed in 
2002, and within a year, it was operating in thirteen of the region’s 29 
municipalities. The first Peace Lab promotes rural development in one 
of the worst areas of the conflict, the Magdalena Medio region. Local 
people, who are resisting the violence and want to create a life outside 
the drug economy, design and manage the program. The EU launched 
a second Peace Lab in 2003 with a similar budget. It covers 62 munici-
palities in three other conflict-ridden regions of Colombia that have a 
population of some 1.4 million people.49
D. Trade
While the EU is generally seen as taking a more passive role in global 
trade when compared to the United States, the EU is one of Colom-
bia’s major trading partners, second only to the U.S. Recognizing that 
Colombia has enormous commercial potential with its varied geo-
graphical topography and incredible biodiversity, the EU is the num-
ber one investor in the country. The EU does not demand reciprocity 
for its exports to Colombia through its General System of Preferences 
(GSP); in addition, the majority of Colombian goods are exempt from 
EU customs duties. By offering Colombia this handsome trade regime, 
the EU clearly hopes to pursue future trade agreements.50
The EU has specific trade objectives when negotiating with Colom-
bia and the Andean community (CAN) as a whole:
1.  To facilitate the implementation of the CAN common market in 
order to promote the movement of goods and services. This com-
mon market will ideally encourage worldwide trade and the adop-
tion of the World Customs Organization’s international standards, 
thus making trade safer for all parties involved;
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2.  To promote the exportation of goods from CAN to the EU through 
GSP until a free trade agreement is negotiated;
3.  To support CAN countries in fulfilling the goals and ideals of the 
WTO.
In order to fulfill these objectives, the EU employs a strategy to 
help Colombia integrate itself into the world economy. Focusing its 
objectives on economic development, the EU provides aid to ensure 
that Colombia’s national products meet global standards, thus making 
Colombia’s goods increasingly marketable at the international level.51
Finally, when considering trade with Colombia, the EU specifically 
states that it hopes to promote fundamental human rights. By support-
ing small business and promoting sustainable socioeconomic develop-
ment, the EU is attempting to improve the human rights situation in 
Colombia by investing in the long term. Furthermore, the EU hopes 
that trade will eventually reduce the need for illicit activities, such 
as drug production and arms trafficking, thus creating a more secure 
social situation for all Colombians.52
VIII. The Impact of U.S. and EU Foreign Policy 
on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia
The impact of foreign policy on human rights can be defined as the suc-
cess of foreign policy in altering (improving or worsening) the human 
rights situation in the recipient country or region.
Depending on the scope of influence, the impact can be direct or 
indirect, short term or long term, intended or unintended, internal or 
external.
When determining the impact of U.S. and EU policies on human 
rights in Colombia, we must return to our original question: whose 
human rights and interests are the policies meeting? Only then can 
we really come to understand the effectiveness of foreign policy and 
identify any discrepancies between what a country’s foreign policy is 
intended to do and what it is actually doing on the ground. There is, 
however, a series of methodological constraints to take into account, 
including the difficulty in isolating the human rights impact of for-
eign policy from that of other actors and their actions, along with the 
statistical accuracy, which, according to Consultoría para los Dere-
chos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES), is highly disputed. In 
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any event, accounts of human rights progress made in Colombia are 
mixed. On one hand, there are optimistic accounts, such that of the 
U.S. Department of State, suggesting that, “[Colombia’s] government 
continues to make progress toward the respect of human rights.”53 On 
the other hand, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
other non-governmental accounts suggest that, “while there have been 
signs of progress, [Colombia’s] human rights and international human-
itarian law situation continue to be areas of great concern.”54
A. U.S. Impact
The impact of the U.S. on Colombia’s human rights situation can be 
described as long lasting, nationwide, and wide scale. On the positive 
side, U.S. involvement in Colombia has greatly contributed to:
•  Greater personal security through reduced abductions, massacres, 
homicides, guerrilla attacks against civilian populations and infra-
structure, and illegal roadblocks. “This is the principal and greatest 
achievement in the promotion and defense of human rights and 
international humanitarian law that a government can hope to pres-
ent,” said Colombian Vice-President Francisco Santos in March 
2004.55
•  USAID is one of the many governmental organizations that con-
sistently contribute to the human rights efforts in Colombia. Sup-
ported by the U.S. government, thousands of internally displaced 
Colombian families now have viable job options and a more secure 
future. USAID donated $280,000 and, with the support of other 
organizations, managed to benefit 600 Cartagena families with 
machinery and equipment, furnishings, and other goods. In addi-
tion to the micro-credit fund that benefited 587 families, 30 families 
were relocated to new homes and 200 people were trained in busi-
ness techniques. More than 3,000 people have benefited and now 
enjoy a better lifestyle.56
•  The Colombian Ministry of Defense released the “Política integral de 
Derechos Humanos y DIH” (Integral Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law Policy), aimed to verify and standardize U.S.-
backed military operations, as well as to avoid extralegal executions 
and other human rights abuses.57
•  A 53% reduction in political crimes and 9% reduction in illegal crop 
plantations, according to the UN (from 86,00 hectares in 2005 to 
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78,000 hectares in 2006).58 According to Bobby Charles, “Seizures 
and eradications are at record levels.”59 As discussed below, the 
negative consequences of fumigation on the subsistence rights of 
the Colombian peasant population is an area of concern, therefore 
impact depends upon how one understands the problem.
•  U.S.-Colombia extradition agreement as a way of directly attacking 
terrorist organizations and their structures (top-level paramilitary 
commanders extradited to the U.S. are unable to continue operat-
ing from there). In addition, although these individuals have been 
charged in the U.S. with narco-trafficking, their extradition ensures 
at least the partial fulfillment of their victims’ rights to truth and 
reparations that originally were not being fulfilled due to the perpe-
trators’ lack of cooperation with Colombian justice.60
•  The restoration of public order and the strengthening of the Colom-
bian state, along with the gradual military and political debilitation 
of FARC and the continued demobilization of paramilitary groups. 
This has resulted in greater protection of the right to security of per-
son and freedom of movement. It has also brought a relative sense 
of peace and economic prosperity, as evidenced through an increase 
in the country’s stock market index and foreign investment flows to 
certain sectors of Colombian society.
On the negative side, the results so far are not reflective of the large 
sums of money invested in Plan Colombia61 in addition to the follow-
ing features of U.S. involvement in Colombia:
•  SOA graduates/Colombian officers have been tried for aggravated 
human rights abuses.
•  Neo-liberal policies aimed at the privatization of public services, as 
well as the influx of agricultural imports, is undermining Colom-
bian nationals’ socioeconomic subsistence rights.
•  Through its actions, the U.S. has defended the interests of Colom-
bian elites who are subservient to U.S. goals and policies, thus 
perpetuating economic and political inequality. Also, through the 
indebtedness of Colombia to U.S. institutions, the U.S. has managed 
to maintain control over Colombia’s natural and human resources, 
particularly oil and labor.62
•  U.S.-backed political assassinations as an example of major human 
rights violations, and the ensuing violence throughout the 20th cen-
tury as the cause of human rights violations.
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•  With specific regard to Plan Colombia, increasing military aid and 
decreasing development aid has a profound impact on Colombia’s 
human rights situation. Furthermore, being historically involved 
in violating the rights to freedom of thought and expression and 
trying to crush the political opposition, the U.S. could be said to be 
responsible for the creation of FARC, and indirectly for the multiple 
human rights violations committed by this illegal group. In addi-
tion, one could argue that the U.S. is responsible for the creation of 
the ultra-right paramilitary groups that are generally regarded as 
a response to FARC, and, in turn, for paramilitary-related human 
rights violations and the escalation of violence across the country.
•  Through fumigation practices, the U.S. is perceived to be responsi-
ble for the loss of the means of livelihood of illicit crop growers, and, 
therefore, a major cause of displacement in Colombia. In addition, 
fumigation often causes severe deterioration of health: “Fumigation 
is a major part of Plan Colombia. It is meant to eradicate coca plants, 
but it is used against peasants and their rights to land. Deadly myco-
herbicides, many food crops destroyed. Florida’s Department of the 
Environment deemed many of these chemicals too dangerous to use 
in their state, but they get sent to Colombia anyway to be sprayed in 
areas of guerrilla activity.”63
It is worth highlighting that U.S. rhetoric on terrorism is conducive 
to U.S. action in Colombia, thus legitimizing such action while at the 
same time magnifying its potential human rights impact. It is also 
important to consider the long-term human rights impact of Colom-
bia’s political, economic, and military dependency on the U.S.
B. EU Impact
The impact of EU policies on Colombia’s human rights situation is very 
recent, area-specific, and therefore limited. The lack of presence and 
participation are, in this sense, important constraints on the human 
rights impact of foreign policy and its capacity to shape human rights 
processes and outcomes.
The literature on the impact of EU policy on Colombia’s human 
rights is still very limited. Despite the newly ambitious breadth of EU 
activity in Colombia, the human rights impact of such activity remains 
a vastly unexplored topic. With that said, the European Commission 
regards the EU’s first Peace Lab as highly successful:
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There is now a community radio. It has constructed 150 schools and 
helped hundreds of families to survive through the farming of 5,000 
hectares of palm oil (each farmer has 10 hectares for palm oil and land 
for subsistence farming), cacao production (helping 6,000 families) and 
exporting baby bananas to Europe. In 2005, the project bought 1,200 
cows to support small ranches in the region. And it has set up many 
local networks bringing together, for example, young people, women, 
fishermen and fisherwomen.64
This points to the EU’s concern for, and concrete action towards, the 
protection of important socioeconomic rights in some of Colombia’s 
poorest and most damaged regions, including the rights to education, 
work, and an adequate standard of living, and freedom from hunger. 
At the same time, and due to the respect that the Peace Labs have 
gained among different actors within the armed conflict, the labs can 
be said to have had limited but positive impact on security, peace, and 
stability, and the basic civil/political and socioeconomic human rights 
that derive from them.
In its 2007 “Conclusions on Colombia” report, the European Council 
has devised concrete objectives and expectations for the EU’s involve-
ment in Colombia.65 Specific areas include disarmament; demobili-
zation and reintegration into society of illegal group members and 
combatants; mediation in a possible humanitarian agreement for 
Colombia; humanitarian aid; poverty reduction; social equality and 
wealth distribution; displacement and the environment; alternative 
social and economic development; trade; human rights promotion; and 
drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. Again, the human 
rights impact of such activities has not yet been determined, but should 
inspire an important amount of research in the future.
U.S. and EU foreign policies have indirectly impacted the human 
rights situation in Colombia through their undeniable influence on 
national policy, on the one hand, and Colombia’s political, economic, 
social, legal, and cultural institutions, on the other. U.S. support has 
been the backbone of President Uribe’s national policy of Democratic 
Security and the “Ley de Justicia y Paz” (Justice and Peace Law), which 
have played a double role in both promoting and violating important 
human rights.66 The EU has played a significant role in emphasizing 
the need for the Colombian government to make peace with the ter-
rorist groups, along with a recent proposal for a humanitarian agree-
ment that would allow hostages to be exchanged for guerrillas. The 
FARC would be offered a “meeting zone,” in a rural and uninhabited 
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area, with no military presence and with the mediation of the Catholic 
Church, in cooperation with European mediators (France, Spain, and 
Switzerland). President Uribe also proposed to send an international 
medical mission to assist the hostages.
The impact of the foreign policy of the U.S. and EU on Colombian 
institutions can potentially have, I would argue, a large-scale impact 
on the promotion of human rights in Colombia. For example, the U.S. 
has had direct impact on Colombia’s military and legal institutions 
(through the strengthening of Colombia’s military and the U.S.-Colom-
bia extradition agreement), though the lack of cooperation with the 
U.S. may also weaken Colombian institutions. Both U.S. and EU for-
eign policies seem to focus on supporting the policies of the Colom-
bian government to promote human rights, yet the question arises as 
to whether foreign efforts to impact national institutions can come to 
fruition in a country like Colombia—one with weak institutions that 
have been deeply infiltrated by the paramilitary and the guerrillas.
C. Combined Impact of U.S. and EU Foreign Policy
The relationship and interactions in the execution of U.S. and EU for-
eign policies towards Colombia invite further reflection on the com-
bined impact that both policies may have on human rights there. Are 
the policies and their outcomes complementary or are they mutually 
exclusive? Are there any instances in which both policies overlap, for 
instance, between the EU’s Instrument for Stability and Defence and 
Security Policy (ESDP) that deals with issues of terrorism, arms trade, 
and security aid, and the U.S.-backed Plan Colombia?
The EU rejects an exclusively military solution to Colombia’s con-
flict. In that sense, U.S. and EU foreign policy in Colombia can be said 
to be complementary, with the U.S. more concerned with the military 
and macroeconomic aspects of the conflict and the EU focusing on 
the more social and structural ones (thus magnifying the combined 
effect of the two different approaches, each of different scope). Yet 
based on their outcomes, U.S. and EU foreign policy in Colombia seem 
contradictory, and perhaps even mutually exclusive, because the U.S. 
approach is in direct opposition to some of the fundamental values that 
the EU and its foreign policy are based upon. It could also be argued 
that a great deal of EU policy efforts and aid go toward mitigating the 
direct consequences of U.S. foreign policy. In other words, EU policy 
serves as a social and humanitarian safety net for U.S. actions. Does the 
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EU bear the cost of the negative consequences of U.S. actions? It is also 
important to reflect upon the degree to which both policies help in the 
deterrence of further human rights violations, and the potential con-
sequences of removing either foreign policy from the current human 
rights picture in Colombia.
IX. Recommendations
(1) U.S. and EU foreign policy makers should strive for greater coher-
ence and coordination between their policies abroad and the models of 
power and global governance the U.S. and EU represent (and the val-
ues they each stand for), along with a better understanding and syn-
chronization of their national interests, foreign policy goals, and the 
on-the-ground realities of their foreign policies. Finally, they should set 
specific human rights goals and expectations for both foreign policies 
and adapt the rhetoric to reflect the priority of human rights relative to 
their other foreign policy interests.
(2) The U.S. and EU should reconcile their policies and enhance coor-
dination with Colombia’s national policies through further incorpo-
ration of human rights and international humanitarian law in their 
approaches to security and public order. An increased social scope 
may, however, elevate the cost of U.S. operations in Colombia through 
greater assistance for the victims of military operations and macroeco-
nomic policy, for instance.
(3) Through increased military power, EU foreign policy could have 
a greater impact on the human rights situation via peacekeeping mis-
sions and human rights monitoring.
(4) Focus more on the impact of U.S. and EU policies on Colombia’s 
national institutions and promote socioeconomic and agrarian reform 
as the primary ways to ensure true protection against human rights 
violations in Colombia.
X. Implications and Lessons on Globalization: 
Concluding Reflections
I have argued that the militaristic and economic development based 
approach to foreign policy in Colombia by the U.S. has contributed 
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to the re-establishment of public order and the promotion of impor-
tant human rights, with the right to personal and human security as 
the main priority. Despite being highly integrated, however, the U.S. 
approach simultaneously undermines basic civil-political and socio-
economic rights of large sections of the Colombian population, par-
ticularly those whose ideological inclination and economic means of 
subsistence oppose U.S. interests (thus resulting in the U.S. directly 
opposing key democratic and human rights principles). On its part, the 
EU foreign policy, through its more social and structural focus, has had 
limited but promising success in tackling the root causes and structural 
aspects of poverty and inequality in Colombia. In that sense, both U.S. 
and EU foreign policy in Colombia can be considered complementary. 
Yet, internal issues of the EU, such as its cumbersome decision-making 
processes and lack of coherent and consistent foreign action both on 
the part of EU member states and EU institutions, continue to limit the 
scope and potential of EU foreign policy in addressing and improv-
ing the human rights situation in Colombia. The impact of EU foreign 
policy on Colombia’s human rights remains a largely under-researched 
area.
Areas of further research include the impact of recent and potential 
political events in the U.S., EU, and Colombia. Examples of hypotheti-
cally possible events include a shift from a military to a more social 
approach following a change in U.S. and/or Colombian administra-
tions, or the further implementation of the Lisbon Treaty with its impli-
cations for EU policy and individual member states’ foreign policies 
toward Colombia. In light of the lack of literature on EU foreign policy 
assessment, future research could focus on evaluating the achieve-
ments of EU foreign policy in relation to human rights in Colombia 
and other target countries and regions.
Finally, this study has shed light on the following two reflections 
and lessons on globalization:
1.  The current state of conflict and human rights around the world 
illustrate the complex relationship and interactions between the 
global and the local spheres of life. The internationalization of con-
flict suggests that a matter that used to be contained within state 
borders has now acquired international and transnational dimen-
sions, in turn becoming a primary foreign policy concern.67 Simul-
taneously, and as suggested by Donnelly, “the moral universality of 
human rights, which has been codified in a strong set of authorita-
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tive international norms, must be realized through the particulari-
ties of national [and local] action.”68
2.  We cannot look at globalization as black or white. The benefits of 
any policy, intervention, or plan directed at changing or sustaining a 
situation abroad come at the expense of certain groups and individ-
uals within different countries. The current challenge for domestic 
and foreign policy makers is to accentuate and extend the benefits 
while mitigating the costs of globalization.
The benefits associated with globalization aside, the costs do not 
fall on countries as a whole, but rather within countries, where there 
are distinct winners and losers. The same is true for international poli-
cies, like Plan Colombia. An example from the study would be the 
idea of competing rights, contained in the idea of protecting American 
security interests at the expense of Colombian nationals, whose rights 
are violated through anti-narcotic strategies like fumigation, as well as 
through the systematic deprivation of the rights to freedom of thought 
and expression of opposition groups and individuals.
Despite its common utilization in our everyday vernacular, global-
ization is an intricate phenomenon that is so far-reaching in its scope 
that it is difficult to take sides in the globalization debate. Globaliza-
tion cannot be viewed simplistically in black and white or as a new 
world order that makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. Colombian 
President Alvaro Uribe’s thesis is that globalization makes society as 
a whole richer by bringing overall economic growth to Colombian 
society. However, the costs inflicted on certain individuals and sectors 
of society require policy makers’ attention. Specifically, and in order to 
ensure global economic security in the future, policy makers, local and 
global, need to work to build a safety net for people living in poverty in 
developing countries. Greater distribution of global wealth is essential 
in order to enhance economic growth to its full potential. Otherwise, 
the contrasts between developed and developing countries will only 
be accentuated by continued globalization. If done right, I believe it is 
possible that globalization can become a part of the solution to some of 
the world’s most pressing problems and help decrease global economic 
inequalities. •
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